What
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Revista Brasileira de Saúde Materno Infantil(Brazilian
Journal of Mother and Child Health) 1(2), May-August 2001 Philip
Musgrove Abstract A
doctor need not learn a great deal of economics in order to understand
some of the basic ideas of health economics.
What is more important than any particular piece of knowledge is
to understand how economists think, particularly how and why they think
about markets. Health economics
emphasizes some market failures which lead to poor health outcomes or
high costs or both, and it concentrates especially on issues of how health
care is paid for—the sources of funding, the pooling of those funds to
provide protection from financial risk, and their use to purchase goods
and services. Better understanding
between economists and health professionals can reduce incomprehension
and antagonism, and offer opportunities for more efficient and equitable
health systems. Acknowledgement
I
must thank Bertoldo Kruse for inviting these reflections.
Many colleagues and friends have contributed to these ideas, particularly
those associated with the World Bank’s Flagship Course in Health Reform.
None of them bears any responsibility for what is said here.
Why
do doctors need to know any
health economics ? The
answer to this question is not obvious: after all, when a physician is
actually practicing medicine there seems to be no room or need for economic
understanding. In fact, it
might get in the way, when what the doctor wants is to concentrate on
the patient before him or her and bring to bear all his or her medical
knowledge, which is typically much more detailed—and certainly more important
at the moment of diagnosis or treatment—than what an economist typically
knows or thinks about. And
doctors have been treating patients, well or badly, for centuries without
troubling themselves with economic concerns. Economics
perhaps has no place in the surgery, the consulting room or the laboratory,
but that is not what matters. In
each of those settings, resources are being used and a production process
is under way, supposedly for the benefit of a consumer—and the use of
limited resources to produce goods and services for intermediate or ultimate
consumers is what economics is primarily about.
How those resources are themselves produced, how they are combined,
who chooses what to produce with them, who will pay for them, and what
all that costs, create the setting in which the physician operates.
Almost everything that happens prior to the encounter between the
physician and the patient is relevant to the economist, even if the latter
is kept outside of the medical practice itself.
If there is something the doctor ought to know of health economics,
it concerns those prior steps, including many of the factors that bring
the patient to his or her attention in the first place. There
are at least three reasons why a physician might disregard this argument
and suppose that economics has nothing useful to offer his or her profession.
One is the fact that health economics is a relatively new sub-discipline.
The seminal article explaining some of the subtleties that distinguish
health from other sectors, particularly in relation to how it is financed,
was published only in 1963 [1].
That opened the whole field of inquiry into risks and information
that characterize health economics today and that has become steadily
more important as more and more of health care is financed by insurance
and the costs of it have risen.
The Journal of Health Economics,
the first publication devoted entirely to the subject, began to publish
only in 1982; by now there is an entire two-volume Handbook
of Health Economics [2] and a number of journals that publish on the
subject. Economists are quick to “invade” fields they find interesting,
and the practicioners of those subjects may take time to notice that they
have become of economic interest. A
second reason is the mistaken supposition that economics is nothing more
than accounting, and while accounts must be kept in medical practice as
in other professions, the logic of the accounting is no different and
the accountant has no special insights to offer.
Much of economics does in fact depend on proper accounting: the
creation of national accounts of income and product, starting more than
a half-century ago, is the precursor of today’s effort to create national
health accounts [3] to show where the funds spent on health come from
and where they go. But the
interpretation of those flows does not follow only from their magnitude,
but from economic theory about how doctors, patients, and financing agencies
behave. A
third, even more mistaken reason, is summarized in the attitude that “health
is not a business”, or should not be one.
Some doctors, and public health professionals in particular, often
find it hard to accept that health care is financed, produced and delivered
in a constellation of markets—as though markets or “business” were intrinsically
inimical to human health. This
argument usually rests on the claim that health care is a basic right
or a basic need, and therefore too important to be left to markets.
But food, which is a much more basic necessity than health care,
is produced and delivered in markets, and there is nothing wrong with
that. The question, in the case of health care, is whether those
markets work in socially desirable ways, or whether they lead to situations
in which some people cannot afford needed care, or the wrong kinds of
care are produced, or at too high a cost, or something else goes wrong.
Economics is, to a large extent, the science of how markets operate,
so it is extremely relevant to markets in which failure may be a matter
of life and death.
What
economics does a doctor not need
to know ? So
it might be helpful for medical professionals to understand some economics,
as it applies to medicine and health.
Does that mean they need to comprehend all of economics, or would
it be safe to ignore large areas of the subject ?
Fortunately, there is much that a doctor does not need to know,
starting with the specific economic issues that arise in sectors very
different from health. The frequent (and frequently loose) use of the
adjective “social” to describe some sectors of the economy might suggest
that medical professionals wanting to understand health economics need
to know something about the economics of related sectors such as education.
Fortunately, this is not the case: in economic terms these fields
are much more different than they are alike [4], and although similar
issues arise in both [5], it is more confusing than helpful to think of
a general economics of “the social sector”.
The peculiarities of health economics mean that a doctor wanting
to learn something about it need not try to understand the economics of
any other sector in detail. Currently
there is great interest in what might be called “the macroeconomics of
health”, and a Commission on Macroeconomics and Health [6] has been created
to study particularly the question of whether better population health
contributes to economic growth, making health even more of a paying investment
than it has traditionally been considered from an individual’s perspective
[7]. That is an interesting
question, but health does not need to be subordinated to income or growth
in order to be regarded as vitally important.
(It is even dangerous to justify health investments by appealing
to their effect on economic outcomes, since such investments may pay off
best for young adults and thereby lead to discrimination against the very
young and the very old.) And
even if there is a strong connection, it does not mean that medical professionals
need to know anything about macroeconomic theory in order to learn something
useful for their own field. All
that a doctor should know is that there are good macroeconomic policies
and bad ones, that inflationary populism is a very bad policy (source)
and that poor macroeconomic management is bad for a country’s health,
particularly the health of poor people.
Much of the criticism directed at “structural adjustment” and its
supposed damaging effects on health really should be directed at the economic
irresponsibility that sometimes made such adjustment necessary in the
first place [8]. Of
course, what economists think they know is often a mixture of what they
know and what they only think, including their more ideological positions
and beliefs. (The same is
true of public health specialists, to be sure.)
One reason that doctors are reluctant to learn more economics is
that they reject some views as ideological—sometimes with good reason,
sometimes mistakenly. For
example, the claim by economists that most of the time, markets are an
efficient mechanism for allocating resources to production and consumption
may sound like ideology, but it is actually a strong empirical proposition.
The history of efforts to control prices, dictate production or
otherwise interfere with the normal working of markets, including particularly
the sad history of Soviet-style economic management, offers abundant evidence.
However, the claim by some economists that all markets are basically
alike, and that in particular markets work just as well in health care
as anywhere else, is not well supported either theoretically or empirically
but includes a large dose of ideology.
One needs to understand how markets work, without being taken in
by “the mystique of markets” [9]. Doctors
who have never talked much with economists—or who have had the misfortune
to talk only to mediocre economists—often think that economists care only
about efficiency and not at all about equity, equality, rights, or the
suffering of the sick and the dispossessed.
It is certainly true that in economic theory, it is easier to agree
on what constitutes or leads to efficiency than to agree about equity;
and it is also true that inefficiency means waste, which means less of
something desirable for someone.
But economic thought also includes a long and deep tradition of
thinking about ethical issues, about what constitutes a just society,
about rights and entitlements [10] and about the possible conflicts between
equity and efficiency and the frequent necessity for choices among societal
objectives [11]. Even for
such a relatively narrow question as what health interventions to purchase
with public money, there are no fewer than nine relevant criteria, of
which at least three concern equity rather than efficiency [12].
The conclusion to draw from all this is that a doctor wanting or
needing to learn some economics does not have to abandon his or her ethical
principles or political views. What he or she should be prepared to do is to question those
principles and views in the light of economics and see how well they hold
up. Economic thinking can
help to identify contradictions or poorly formulated opinions.
It does not impose a set of ethical or political suppositions or
preferences. (In fact, the
economics of consumer behavior starts with an unquestioned respect for
preferences.) Understanding
how economists think
More
than knowing any particular conclusion of economics, a doctor needs to
understand the way that economists think: incomprehension and conflict
arise more from differences in the way the two professions approach questions,
than from the specific answers to those questions.
An economist does not, contrary to popular superstition, think
only or primarily about money, even if he or she often tries to find monetary
equivalents of other measures. Economists
think about resources, and particularly about whether those resources have prices
and if so, whether they are the right prices to assure efficiency or equity.
Since resources have costs,
whether those are recognized or not, economists want to know if the use
of those resources produces effects
(non-monetary) or benefits (usually
monetized) sufficient to justify how they are used. Much work in economics is devoted to comparisons among these
concepts, under the names of cost-effectiveness
analysis, cost-utility analysis
or cost-benefit analysis [13].
It is important for doctors to understand that while costs are
the specialty of economists, the definition and estimation of effects
or outcomes is the province of medical professionals: these analyses have
to be joint efforts. Given
an estimate of an effect (deaths averted, for example), economists often
then go on to try to put a monetary value on the result, and such efforts
can be questioned and rejected.
What a doctor needs to understand is that while any particular
kind of effect can be related to costs without monetizing the effect,
there is no common currency besides money in which to compare different
kinds of effects (health outcomes versus education, say), and that to
avoid monetary valuations is to abstain from all such cross-sectoral comparisons. As
mentioned earlier, economists naturally think about markets, ideally without
any prior assumptions about how well they work.
To reject the idea of markets because some market outcomes are
inefficient or inequitable or both, is to miss one of the main ideas that
economists always carry with them.
But markets are not simply theaters in which two characters called
“supply” and “demand” interact, important as those two concepts are.
Markets are places where people interact, in many different roles,
as payers, investors, providers, patients, consumers and citizens; so
economists concentrate on the behavior
that occurs in markets, and in particular on the incentives
that people face to behave one way or another. It is true that economists tend to talk mostly about financial
or economic incentives, because they understand those best.
That does not mean that other incentives—the desire to help others,
professional pride, and so on—do not matter, only that economic analysis
starts by taking those for granted, and then asks what happens to behavior
when prices, means of payment, regulations or other incentives are modified.
Particularly in the health sector, the economic incentives are
often perverse, acting contrary to the desired outcomes, so it is crucial
to analyze them and correct them if possible. In
considering the incentives and regulations to behave one way or another,
economists have to assume that behavior is not simply a collection of
responses to random impulses, but that people have some set of goals or
objective function, that they are trying to get the most (or the least)
of something out of their actions.
It makes a difference, sometimes a great difference, what those
objectives are. For example,
a producer of a good or service will behave differently, depending on
whether he or she aims to maximize profits, to maximize revenue, to assure
a particular level of income, to capture a particular share of a market,
to minimize risk, or to produce the highest possible quality of output.
Since objectives are not always stated, and may not even be clearly
known to the agent whose behavior is of interest, there is necessarily
some speculation involved, and the confrontation of different assumptions
with observed behavior. In
this respect, economics has much more in common with psychology than with
accounting or engineering. Incentives,
to be effective, have to work on people’s objectives; misunderstanding
what they want or are trying to do can lead to perverse incentives and
unwanted outcomes. Finally,
economists pay much attention to who has, and who needs, how much and
what kind of information. People make all kinds of decisions based on the information
they have (or think they have), and entire markets can work badly when
information is incomplete (no one knows) or asymmetric (buyers know more
than sellers, or vice versa), particularly if revealing information would
damage the interests of the person who has it.
Ignorance is obviously dangerous in the face of an epidemic, or
for a person who faces a risk but is unaware of it or does not respond
to information about it. Smoking
is a marked example of this danger [14, especially chapters 7 and 8].
Some kinds of information lend themselves to accounting and standardized
reporting (the basis of national health accounts and of much of epidemiology),
but others do not, because they concern only individual actors or are
costly to collect or interpret.
Medical professionals also recognize the importance of information
for detection, diagnosis, treatment and evaluation.
What economic thinking adds is the emphasis on how information
or the lack of it influences behavior, with economically important consequences. Important
specifics of health economics
First,
health is a very peculiar asset because unlike almost anything else, including
even some other forms of human capital, it is almost entirely inalienable.
One can donate blood or even a kidney to improve someone else’s
health, but “health” itself cannot be transferred, and one must have some
state of health, however poor. Since health is subject to many random shocks of illness or
accident, and since health care can be catastrophically costly, one needs
insurance against financial risk as well as the protection against physical
risks provided by good nutrition, exercise and a range of public health
measures such as sanitation and immunization.
But the character of health makes it harder to insure than other
assets, especially since the value of one’s health and the financial risk
are not correlated with one’s capacity to pay.
Thus one of the principal obstacles to making a health system work
properly, is the difficulty of financing it so as to provide a reasonable
and affordable degree of protection to everyone, without creating incentives
either to do without such protection or to over-use medical care because
the cost is borne by others—and while assuring that subsidies flow in
the desirable directions. This
difficulty is independent of the amount spent on health.
The
emphasis on financing in discussions
of health economics is entirely justified, then; but a doctor also needs
to understand that there are three parts to it.
It matters not only how health is funded,
that is, who pays for it and through what mechanisms (taxes, social security,
voluntary insurance, charity, out of pocket payments) but also whether
and how those funds are pooled
to share risks among population groups, and how they are then used to
purchase goods and services [16, chapter 5].
Each of these stages presents its own set of questions and difficulties,
often with conflicts between economic efficiency and equity or fairness.
One
important source of conflict is that what people want
in the way of health care does not necessarily match what doctors think
people need; and when needs
and demands do not coincide, it is impossible for the supply
of services simultaneously to satisfy both of them [17, pp. 23-24].
Several of the reasons why need, demand and supply do not automatically
match up, go by the name of “market failure”, meaning that while there
is a working market for health care, it does not reach the kind of efficient
equilibrium that a so-called perfect market would achieve.
Doctors need to understand these reasons, which include standard
economic concepts such as public goods, externalities, information failures,
and non-competitive behavior. They
also need to distinguish these problems from other reasons for unsatisfactory
health outcomes which are just as important but which are not “failures”
in the economist’s sense—such as poverty, and inequality of risks or of
income. “Failure”
is one word to which economists give a fairly exact meaning that may not
match the commonsense notion doctors are likely to have, and it is important,
as in any dialog, to develop a clear, shared vocabulary.
Arguing over whose definition to use, or not recognizing that the
same word may be used in two meanings, is wasteful: the best example of
this is the difference between the economist’s term “public good” and
the medical sense of “public health”.
All public goods in health are part of public health, but the converse
is not true, and the difference matters for public policy. Purchasing,
the last stage of financing health, involves two complex questions: what
to buy, and how to pay the providers—doctors, hospitals, vendors of goods
and services. The difference
between need and want, and the enormous variation in costs of medical
procedures, are crucial for the first choice, as is the definition of
what one is trying to achieve. Maximal
overall population health as an objective will lead to different choices
than improving the health of the worst-off, or giving everyone something
like the same chance to have his or her health problems resolved.
And doctors need to understand that while the size of a health
problem—for example, the burden of disease attributed to a particular
disease or condition—is highly relevant to how much it might cost to deal
with the problem, decisions about what interventions should have priority
do not depend simply on the magnitude of the problem [18, 19].
A full evaluation of a health system draws on many different kinds
of information [20]; some ways of using or combining different kinds of
data are useful or legitimate, and some are not.
Incentives
are crucially important to the second question, and deciding on the best
way to pay providers is greatly complicated by a feature that is peculiar
to health care—the practice of referral from one level or type of facility
or professional to another. There
does not seem to be one ideal way to pay all the different providers involved
in a system, so a doctor needs to understand the virtues and deficiencies
of different payment systems (fee-for-service, global budget, per bed-day,
for diagnostic-related groups, and so on) and how they interact.
Aligning incentives and creating a good institutional environment
is most important for hospitals, the most complex organizations in health
system [16, chapter 3]. How
to pay, as opposed to how much to pay, is an example of the importance
of institutions and regulations in health economics: it is not a matter
of costs, in the first instance, but it may have a large impact on both
costs and health outcomes. More
generally, doctors need to know that much of health economics is concerned
with the rules of the game and not simply with the flows of money, goods
and services. One particular
issue of this sort is that of the right degree of autonomy for individual
doctors and for the organizations in which they work and the organizations
which purchase their services—which are not the same, when there is a
“purchaser-provider split” between funding and purchasing agencies, and
the producers of medical services.
Too little autonomy, too much dictation from above or outside,
is practically a guarantee of waste; too much freedom may be an invitation
to abuse, low quality or excessive costs.
As with many other issues, economics does not provide final answers,
but it does offer a way of thinking about them that can facilitate better
decisions and ultimately better outcomes.
Gains
from better understanding Suppose
a medical professional accepts the need to understand some health economics,
perhaps including the specific ideas just discussed.
What can he or she hope to gain thereby ? What is the likely pay-off for the effort involved in learning
some new vocabulary, accepting new and different viewpoints, and possibly
having to give up or modify some cherished ideas ? The most obvious benefit is that it becomes easier to talk
with economists, when one cannot avoid doing so—and as decisions about
health care come to depend more and more on economic considerations, it
becomes harder to keep economists out of the discussion.
Doctors sometimes fear being crowded out of decisions over which
historically they had full control.
Perhaps the best way to assure that their knowledge and views continue
to be respected is to learn something about the knowledge and views of
the newcomers to the other side of the table.
Reducing the level of incomprehension and antagonism that often
characterizes such encounters at first, is worth some trouble.
Ideally,
better mutual understanding between medical professionals and economists
will actually improve the efficiency of health care, and maybe even its
equity. By examining their
own behavior and responses to incentives in the light of economics, doctors
may see ways to be more effective or less wasteful of resources; and they
should be better prepared to accept, and influence, reforms to how they
work and how they are paid. There
is nothing guaranteed, or easy, about reform processes in health, but
they seem sure to work better when all involved have at least some knowledge
of all the relevant factors. For
society as a whole, a better working health system is clearly the greatest
potential gain from a fuller understanding between the two professions.
Finally,
at least for some medical professionals there can be a purely scientific
or intellectual pleasure in exploring the thinking of another profession
and thereby seeing one’s own profession differently.
Of course, this can lead to frustration, because the new ideas
may be hard to put into practice and can lead to friction with one’s own
colleagues. This is especially likely when techniques of economic evalaution
are stretched too far or their results conflict too strongly with perceived
political imperatives [20, pp. 12-17].
But such stretching and conflict are often a necessary part of
learning, and may ultimately be the basis for different political imperatives
and reform opportunities.
References [1] Kenneth
Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”.
American Economic Review 53: 941-73, 1963. [2] Anthony
J. Culyer and Jospeh P. Newhouse, eds., Handbook
of Health Economics. Volume
17 of Handbooks in Economics. Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 2000. [3] Jean-Pierre Poullier and
Patricia Hernández, “Estimates of National Health Accounts (NHA) for 1997”,
WHO/EIP Discussion Paper 27. Geneva:
World Health Organization, 2000. [4] Cláudio de Moura Castro and
Philip Musgrove, “On the Nonexistence of ‘the Social Sector’, or why Education
and Health are more different than alike”. Washington, DC: Inter-American
Development Bank discussion paper, 2000. [5] Emmanuel
Jiménez, Pricing Policy in the Social
Sectors: Cost Recvery for Education and Health in Developing Countries.
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Paul Schultz, eds., Wealth from
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Washington, DC: Interamerican Development Bank, 2000. [8] Michel Garenne and Eneas
Gakusi, “Health Effects of Structural Adjustment Programs in sub-Saharan
Africa”. Paris: French Center
for Population and Development Studies (CEPED) working paper, 2000. [9]
Sara Bennett, The mystique
of markets: public and private health care in devloping countries.
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Health Care: How are Different Criteria Related ?”
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L. Stoddart and George W. Torrance, Methods
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2nd edition. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997. [14] Prabhat Jha and Frank Cahloupka, eds.,
Tobacco Control in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. [15] Victor R. Fuchs, The
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MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. [16] World Health Organization, World
Health Report 2000 – Health Systems: Improving Performance.
Geneva: WHO, 2000. [17] Philip Musgrove, Public
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Washington, DC: World Bank discussion paper No. 339, 1996. [18] Dean T. Jamison, W. Henry Mosley, Anthony
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